

## **The Radcliffe Award of August 1947: A Reappraisal with a Focus on Role of Viceroy Mountbatten in its Deliberation and Implementation**

**Muhammad Iqbal Chawla**

University of the Punjab, Lahore

This paper discusses the role of Mountbatten, as the last Viceroy of united India, in the partition of India and the division of Bengal and Punjab as well. Mountbatten forced Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to accept the division of Punjab and Bengal, the two largest Muslim-majority provinces of united India. Along with devising the 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan for India's division he also constituted the Radcliffe Commission for demarcating the boundaries between India and Pakistan. There are two contradictory claims however, the dominant viewpoint is that Mountbatten changed the original boundary plan prepared by Radcliffe to appease Jawahar Lal Nehru and to punish Jinnah for not accepting him as the joint Governor-General of both India and Pakistan. In fact, this unjust Radcliffe Award sowed the seeds of the hitherto unresolved numerous issues including the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, which caused three wars between them. Therefore, it is important to review and revisit the perceptions about the Mountbatten's role regarding formation, working and final decisions of the Radcliffe Commission. With the passage of more than seventy years since India and Pakistan emerged on the scene as independent nations previously unavailable official documents such as Mountbatten Papers, Churchall Papers, Attlee Papers etc., are now available which can help us get a greater picture of Mountbatten's thoughts and actions about the Radcliffe Award.

**Keyword:** Mountbatten, Jinnah, Nehru, India, Pakistan, Radcliffe Award, Kashmir

For Pakistan, among the scars of partition, the unfair division of the boundaries is the one still abundantly draining. (Tinker:1977) The friendly relations could have been established seven decades ago, only if Mountbatten, had not become a party with Congress to help Nehru have his birthplace- Kashmir by making Radcliffe to compromise in the Radcliffe Award.

The announcement to set India free started with the outbreak of Second World War but formally it was announced by Attlee's announcement of February 20, 1947. It was pronounced that India will be granted complete independence. To actualize the announcement Mountbatten was sent to India. He struggled to keep India united and on failing he brought forth the June 3 Plan of 1947 which enshrined the seeds of division of Punjab and Bengal in case of partition of India which was contrary to the Cabinet Mission Plan which the His Majesty Government had devised with complete consultation and coordination with the Congress and the League. The Cabinet Mission Plan had guaranteed the undivided Punjab and Bengal in case of failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan. However, on Jinnah's insistence on the partition of India, on the basis of Lahore Resolution, the Congress demanded the division of Punjab and Bengal on the communal basis. Therefore, Lord Mountbatten gave his own plan known as 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan which proposed the partition of India and division of Punjab and Bengal. Thus a Boundary Commission under Radcliffe was constituted which initiated the process of chalking out the boundaries of the new states (Brass: 2006). The change of date of termination of the British rule in India by Mountbatten from June 1948 to August 1947, though it helped him to scuttle the British from India peacefully but it resulted in bloodbath unprecedented in the modern history (Singh: 2010).

The demand for Pakistan was the culminating point of a process which had started a long time back

and acquired a concrete shape through the high handed, majority obsessed policies of the Congress and Gandhi, Nehru and Patel mainly were responsible for it (Moon, 1961, p. 14).

But it was the last act of the drama; its planning and execution, that exposed to its full the policies and intentions of the Raj and in this process Mountbatten became a hero for India and villain for Pakistan. (Hasan, 2001, p. 42). This paper would like to shed light on the Radcliff Award to explore, examine and analyze the planning and execution of the Radcliffe Award by Lord Mountbatten. In this paper attempts will be made to understand how far Mountbatten tried to influence the Award to wrest an outcome favorable for India and who were other characters and institutions responsible for finalizing the Award.

The Draft of the 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan, prepared by Mountbatten was submitted to London on 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1947. (Jalal, 1985, p. 29-53). Punjab and Bengal were given the option of going alone, or split between India and Pakistan, the Greater Bengal Scheme was encouraged for that purpose, because Calcutta was the lifeline of Indian industry and commerce. After getting approval from London, Mountbatten showed the plan to Nehru and Krishna Menon, Muslim League's leadership was kept completely aloof, the plan provoked a violent reaction from Nehru and within six hours VP Menon came up with a new set of proposals (Collins & Lapierre: 163). and Mountbatten flew to London to get it approved even taking Jinnah, main leader of the All India Muslim League and Muslim community, into the picture. In the new plan it was proposed was that Punjab and Bengal should be divided. (Bolitho, 2006, p. 165) Unlike NWFP, Balochistan and Sylhet, no option for referendum or plebiscite was given to these two provinces. Nor they were not given the option of either joining India or Pakistan in totality. Princely states were to join either of the two countries or to remain independent (Hilary, 2012, p. 104).

A commission under the Cyril Radcliff was constituted to determine the area consisted of Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority in Punjab and Bengal (Ali: 2009). Jinnah insisted that the United Nation should be requested to recommend three members of each commission but Nehru disagreed thus the Jinnah's proposal did not carried out. He thought it would cause unnecessary deferment in the process of partition (Singh, 442) Jinnah suggested the appointment of three Law Lords from the England. This idea also was rejected by Mountbatten with this argument that the Lord may not like to come during the summer season (Hodson: 1985, 386).

#### **Formation of the Boundary Commission:**

Therefore, for the implementation of the 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan, Mountbatten appointed Cyril Radcliffe as the Chairman of Boundary Commissions, though there were three commissions to deal with the Punjab, Bengal and Boundary As per suggestion of Nehru, equal representation was given to the Muslims and non-Muslim on these three commissions (Chatterji, 1999, p. 185-242). As per suggestion of Nehru, equal representation was given to the Muslims and non-Muslim Mountbatten appointed Cyril Radcliffe as the Chairman of all those Boundary Commissions (Chester, 2000, p. 42).

#### **Mountbatten's Role**

Therefore, Mountbatten arrived in India with a prepared agenda, extraordinary powers, special instructions and a selected staff, although he did not have plenipotentiary powers. The draft plan had to be taken to London and the changes made had to be approved, although he did take it upon himself to press the case for protecting the mutual interests of Congress High Command and the British (Quraishi, 1995).

A number of factors are crucial to the understanding of the motives behind Mountbatten's actions, chiefly the dismissal of Lord Wavell, the Penultimate Viceroy of India, the disposition of the British cabinet, the hand picking of Mountbatten as the new Viceroy, and his own proclivities and prejudices tied to the complexly knitted web of Indian politics. Only an in-depth analysis of the interplay between these forces will help us in sifting facts from fiction. A lot of evidence exists which proves that the dismissal of Wavell and appointment of Mountbatten were "caused by constant prodding and pressure from the Congress" (Chawla, 2009, p. 220). Gandhi persisted on "calling this mad man back" and sending "an abler and legal mind to assist Wavell." Nehru's paranoia was well known with any British officer who displayed the tendency to favour

Jinnah and the Muslim League. He accused Wavell of "trying to appease Mr Jinnah and the Muslim League" (Chawla, 2009, p. 69-95). His left wing friends in London had sufficient influence over the British cabinet to make them act on his suggestions. Krishna Menon claims that he suggested Mountbatten's name on Nehru's behalf who had met Mountbatten in March 1946 in Singapore and in London in December 1946. A mental understanding existed between them long before Mountbatten landed on the Indian soil. This argument is further substantiated by the testimony of Charles Smith; Mountbatten's trusted valet and butler for fifty years, who says that Mountbatten was appointed Viceroy on Nehru's recommendation. Moreover "the Labour Party in power was traditionally sympathetic to the policies of the Congress" (Sherwani, 1989, p. 49).

### **The 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan**

Mountbatten, the Viceroy who saw the demise of British rule in India, was given the mandate to revive the already dead Cabinet Mission Plan, to transfer power to United India and to avoid partition if he could. (Raza, 1982, p. 20) He himself had confessed to Collins and Lapierre that "Nobody, and particularly me, wished to have any partition in India." Pakistan was "a sheer madness". Mountbatten strongly believed that there is inherent flaw in the two nation theory presented by Jinnah and therefore, if India is to partition on the religious grounds then Punjab and Bengal must also be divided on the same basis because in these two Muslim majority provinces there is big size of religious community of non-Muslims (Roberts, 2010).

### **Radcliffe as Chairman of the Commission**

Sir Cyril Radcliffe, considering him as most brilliant and neutralist expert lawyer who quite honestly would give his decision after determining the adjoining majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims in Punjab and Bengal (Chester, 2000, p. 256-275). Whereas the Boundary Commission on Sylhet simply had to demarcate the Muslim majority areas, the Bengal and Punjab Commissions was also advised to consider "other factors" which in fact was to facilitate the non-Muslim specially the Sikh population of Gurdaspur (Collins & Lapierre, 1982, p. 168). But the nature of these other factors was never clarified. The Pakistanis historians of the view that other factors were used against the demarcation of boundary in favour of India and against Pakistan, therefore, inherent seeds of dishonesty were sown in the rules of the business which ultimately went against Pakistan. Therefore, proceedings of the Award became doubtful right from the beginning (Statesman, 1947).

Radcliffe's appointment was a 'political rather than a judicial one and Muslim League should not have accepted it (Ali, 2009; Kudaisya & Yong, 2004). He had never set foot on the Indian soil before and was asked to perform an operation of the gravest sort within weeks. He was 'given forty days to complete the task, which according to his own estimate, should have taken two years (Von, 2007) and was to reside in the Comptrollers's estate where, in Campbell-Johnson's words, "he could work in isolation" (Johnson, 1951, p. 178). Punjab and Bengal despite being Muslim majority areas were subjected to division on constant pressure from Congress but the same rule was not applied to Hindu majority areas. The future of Kashmir was decided by Congress long before Mountbatten put forward his first proposals (Grover & Arora, 1997, p. 154). The planting of the Trojan horse in the appointment of VP Menon to the inner circle of Mountbatten advisers, and Rao Sahed V D Ayer as Secretary to Radcliffe's Boundary Commission speak of a well thought pre-planned treachery.

The partition date was brought forward a full year before the original year it was set to take place, mainly to avoid intensity of civil war and peaceful exit of the colonial administration (Chawla: 2016). Mountbatten's decision to delay the disclosure of the Punjab Boundary Award, writes Burke, which had been ready since the evening of 12<sup>th</sup> August, cost extra Punjabi lives, cannot be doubted (Burke & Quraishi, 1995, p. 547). His own attempts to skirt around the blame on the excuse that he had done so to "avoid a political blow up" he felt that the later the announcement was postponed, the less would the inevitable odium react upon the British.' and being the proverbial hero he had to save the "laboriously-contrived constitutional process for the orderly transfer of power." One wonders if the partition from any angle presented an orderly transfer, in fact it had all the makings of an order to end all orders ( Samad: 1999)

### **Radcliffe Award**

In Punjab the three districts of Ferozepur, Amritsar and Gurdaspur had 60 percent Muslim population but were awarded to India, Gurdaspur provided the shortest and the only land route for India into Kashmir and therefore was the key to the Indian dream of Kashmir. Amritsar had its own sanctity for the Sikhs; the Golden Temple became a sufficient reason to grant Amritsar to Sikhs, ironically the same rule was not applied to Nankana Sahib, Punja Sahib and the Marhi in Lahore. The undue favor owed much to the services of the Sikhs to the British during the war of independence. Jinnah had made desperate attempts to win over the Sikhs to keep Punjab intact, he even agreed to an independent Sikh state, but the Sikh leaders Tara Singh refused to meet Jinnah and entered into an alliance with the Congress, in return for a regular stipend and without the consent of his community.

The impression given by Radcliffe to the Muslim League members, namely Din Muhammad and Muhammad Munir was that 'three tehsils of Ferozapore, Zira and Fazilka' would be included in Pakistan but in the final award they were given to India (Khushik R.K., 2015). In Gurdaspur District, two contiguous Muslim majority tehsils, Gurdaspur and Batala, were given to India along with the Pathankot tehsil. The Muslim majority tehsil, Ajnala in the Amritsar District, was also handed over to Bharat. In the Jullundur district, the Muslim majority tehsils, Nakodar and Jallundur, were assigned to India. In his justification, Radcliffe claimed he had to take into consideration "factors like disruption of railway communications and water systems which displaced the primary claims of contiguous majorities" (Ali, 1967, p. 214). The boundary line drawn by Radcliffe did not follow river courses but was cutting them and railway lines were bound to be cut," no matter how the boundary line was drawn." India, consequently, tried to devastate Pakistan by permanently shutting off sources of water (Ali, 1967, p. 214).

The most unjust step of the Radcliffe Award to handover Gurdaspur to India. (Ali, 1967, p. 215) Even one Indian member of Commission Mahajan later on disclosed that it Radcliffe changed the boundary line and gave India district of Gurdaspur due to undue influence of Mountbatten (Sadullah, 1983, p. 267-68; Ziegler, 1985, p. 397-98). It was done to appease Nehru, and thus sowed the seeds of Indo-Pakistan permanent enmity. In fact, India had no practical land contact to Kashmir if Gurdaspur would have not granted to India. Consequently, Hari Singh, Hindu ruler of Kashmir, instead of acceding to India would have opted to Pakistan (Pakistan Times, 1948). The tearing of the Muslim area of Gurdaspur district from Pakistan had been precisely so devised as to facilitate and ensure India's communications with Jammu and Kashmir. Nor did Kashmir's strategic importance escape the attention of the Congress leaders, Nehru was by origin a Kashmiri and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, President of the pro-India Kashmiri National Conference, was his very close friend (Lodhi, 1993, p. 37). Mountbatten himself admitted that 'Kashmir was so placed geographically that it could join either dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur were put into East Punjab by the Boundary Commission.' (Mansergh et al., 1983, 335). British officialdom also fell for the argument that Amritsar and Gurdaspur if included in Pakistan, the number of 'Punjab Sikhs' in Pakistan would be about 2.2 million, much more the Sikh population in Indian Punjab, so to appease the Sikhs both the districts had to be excluded from the western zone. The Sikhs being the favourite 'Martial Race' of the British and their services in the War of Independence and World Wars had not been forgotten by the Colonial masters (Mahajan, 1963, p. 116). Besides, "the Sikhs had many well-wishers among civil servants as well as on the Viceroy's personal staff" (Sherwani, 1986, p. 2).

Lamb, a British historian, writes that if there was fair, and just Radcliffe award, three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur District would have gone to Pakistan and naturally Kashmir would have become a part of Pakistan (Lamb, 1991; Lodhi, 1993, p. 36). A Pakistani Gurdaspur would surely be the signpost pointing towards a Pakistani Jammu and Kashmir, "For Pakistan it was a "deliberate policy" on the part of Mountbatten to 'strangle Pakistan". He also created problem for Pakistan while disturbing the Mandi Hydro-electric supply lines and overall damaging the Hydroelectric and Canal system of the undivided Punjab (Lodhi, 1993, p. 36).

East Bengal was a home of jute industry, and districts of Nadia and Kutli was expected to be appended with Pakistan. India also received Darjeeling and Jalpaigari similarly to ascertain the wishes of the Muslims referendum was held in district of Sylhet instead of giving complete district of Sylhet. The referendum in Sylhet the overwhelming Muslim population opted for Pakistan. The Award gave East Bengal about 60% of the

population of the two undivided provinces and only 40% of their areas, this was further complicated by the fact that East Bengal had very few resources and hardly any industries (Mansergh, 1983 pp. 226-27).

Calcutta, which was the hub of Bengal's industry and trade, instead of being made a neutral international city, was handed over to Congress as part of a deal made with Mountbatten (Williams, 1966, p. 84). On 15<sup>th</sup> January 1950, Patel made a speech at Calcutta in which he confessed that 'We made a condition that we would only agree to partition if we did not lose Calcutta' (Burke & Quraishi, 1995, p. 550).

Notwithstanding the fact that Muslims formed the majority of the population of Calcutta's hinterland, on which depended Calcutta's life as a city and port, Pakistan had a strong claim on it because "Calcutta had been built mainly by the resources of East Bengal, which also provided the bulk of its seamen and port workers" (Ali, 1983, p. 207).

The demand for a plebiscite by Pakistan was turned down because for Mountbatten it was "most undesirable to lay down a procedure of self-determination which would give the wrong answer". The only right answer was the answer in favour of the Congress. Although, under Suhrawardy's pursuance Mountbatten had sent V. P. Menon to Patel requesting to put Calcutta under joint control for six months while partition was taking place, Patel's answer was: No, Not even for six hours. Hugh concluded that ".Murshidabad district, the centre of the old Muslim culture was allotted to India...the allocation of Khulna ...was not adequate recompense, However, the Chittagong Hill Tracts were given to Pakistan...altogether West Bengal gained substantially over East Bengal under the Award" (Tinker, 1967, p. 147). This "did not prevent a blaze of indignation from the Congress side over the allocation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts" (Lapierre & Collins, 2017, 282).

Therefore, the Radcliffe Award proved harmful to Pakistan because it deprived Pakistan of a large chunk of territorial area which was strategic and economically very vital for future of the state. Besides these blatant prejudices to the Muslims the Radcliffe Award produced no natural boundary line between the two countries which were hostile to each other. Shortly the irregularities of the Award began appear and soon it was felt that there would be negative impacts on India-Pakistan long term relations. It was pointed out that head-works of a canal system starts on one country and ends up in other country. It was also felt that the ridges went on wrong sides. Unfortunately, intersected a homes, villages, cities. Later on it was felt territorial adjustment had divided Punjabis (Lapierre & Collins, 2017, 282).

## Results

There are two accounts which give evidence of members of Viceroy's staff having discussions regarding boundary questions with Radcliffe.

Menon's own admission at the staff meeting on 28<sup>th</sup> July, the minutes of which read: "Menon said that he had suggested to Sir Cyril Radcliffe the possibility that Nankana Sahib might be made some sort of Vatican. The second is the entry in Christie's diary under 25<sup>th</sup> July 'dined with Ismay, Cyril Radcliffe and Christopher Beaumont were there...I gave C.R a thumbnail sketch of the CHT (Chittagong Hill Tracts) which is going to be a problem (with map)" (Khan, 1995). On 12<sup>th</sup> August Radcliffe had told Campbell-Johnson and Christie that he could not withhold publication longer than 13<sup>th</sup> of August because 'too many people knew' that it was ready and the contents revealed, yet Mountbatten wrote to Jinnah and Nehru on 13<sup>th</sup> August that he had 'no idea' of its contents. Even Philippe Zeigler was bound to admit that 'a nugget of uncertainty remains' (Ziegler, 1985) Apart from that, there were a number of other social occasions in which Mountbatten and his staff constantly was in touch with Radcliffe, which puts their impartiality into doubt. The annexation of Ferozepur to India reeks of injustice and treachery of the highest order. Christopher Beaumont secretary to the Radcliffe commission, revealed the details of how the alterations were made in the Award in a statement published in the daily Telegraph of February 24<sup>th</sup>, 1992. His evidence has been corroborated by Sir Ian Scott, Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy. According to Beaumont, in the draft proposal by Radcliffe submitted on the 8 of August, Ferozepur was shown in Pakistan. The maps were also given to Governor of Punjab Sir Ivan Jenkins and to 'the

pilot of the aircraft who was to fly Radcliffe to view the actual boundary from the air (Khan, 1995). But when Mountbatten declared the Awards on 27<sup>th</sup> of August Ferozepur and Zila had gone to India. Historians from across the divide agree on the validity of the proof which exists on this issue, the discrepancy in both maps reveals the deceitful act which was so shamelessly carried out and later denied (Masani, 2015).

Sir Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab had asked George Abel, Mountbatten Private Secretary, for the map showing the partition lines so that he could deploy troops around areas which were most seriously prone to communal violence, Beaumont had provided the information and Abell on 8<sup>th</sup> August had sent a letter to Punjab Governor's Secretary, Stuart Abbott confirming "there will not be any great changes from this boundary" (Hussan Zia, 1995).

That map remained in Jenkins safe. Abell, later on sent a telegram to Governor Jenkins to destroy the map in his possession, for some reason Jenkins forgot and left the telegram and the map in his safe after handing over charge to Francis Mudie. According to this map Ferozepur was shown in Pakistan but the final plan incorporated it in India. Between 8<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> August something had transpired to change the mind of Radcliffe because on 11<sup>th</sup> August, the governor of Punjab had received a cypher telegram in which it was stated "Eliminate Salient", it was believed that it was referred to the district of Ferozepur which subsequently was appended to India. Pakistan suspected Radcliffe being pressurized by Mountbatten who was in compliance with Nehru, who in his turn was aligned with Bikaner, 'whose state could have been very adversely affected if the canal headwork's at Ferozepur had been wholly in the hands of Pakistan' (Gabriel, 1996). Pakistan's government discovered the records but Mountbatten and Radcliffe completely denied all charges. Radcliffe as an extra precaution had destroyed all his documents in his possession, thus leaving no traces of the crime. Mountbatten tried to save his face by promising to compensate for Pakistan's loss by giving them more land in East Pakistan, in the blame game which followed he 'blamed Abell for sending the map without his knowledge and permission' (Roberts, 2010, p. 92-101). Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, on Liaqut Ali Khan's instruction, visited Lord Ismay to convey Jinnah's concern over changes in the Award, (Abid, 2011). Ismay met him in the study room where Radcliffe was working with him. There was a map hanging in the room with a pencil line drawn across the map of Punjab, which was exactly the line about which Jinnah had been informed through Justice Munir, as he had accompanying Radcliffe on the aerial survey, the flight plan of which showed Gurdaspur in India. When Chaudhri Muhammad Ali pointed it out to Ismay he turned pale and asked in confusion 'Who has been fooling with this map?' (Garewal, 2011, p. 111).

Jinnah underestimated Radcliffe, who was supposedly chosen for his professional integrity and intelligence, proved to be inept for his job. He was totally unaware of India's terrain and did not resist the undue influence and pressure from Mountbatten. The extent to which the Award was twisted by Mountbatten puts the whole claim of British justice and fairness to ground. Singh's research compels him to admit that he (Mountbatten) undoubtedly did inspire some of its vital features.<sup>78</sup> It raised serious doubt about the legal prowess and professional integrity of Radcliffe because what factors forced him to 'discuss the issue with Mountbatten at all' if he was such 'an independent adjudicator'. He proved himself to be a 'weak man who allowed himself to be knowingly manipulated, not even having the 'moral courage and decency to reveal the truth or leave some record for posterity'.

### Conclusion

It is difficult to blame Mountbatten for the unjust Radcliffe Award because of lack of clear-cut documentary evidence whether he influenced Cyril Radcliffe's decisions or not. However, if one closely reads the Mountbatten papers one gets the impression that Mountbatten showed his deep-seated resentment about Jinnah's decision who had rejected Mountbatten's proposal of becoming a common governor general of India and Pakistan. When Jinnah shared the decision of his party with Mountbatten that it had turned down the suggestion and was not ready to accept him as governor general of Pakistan as well, the news greatly upset him. Mountbatten, therefore, decided to teach a lesson to Jinnah and hurt Pakistan. Jinnah, as a charismatic leader of India, was the only Muslim leader who could stand up to the blue blooded Viceroy and as a result, Mountbatten's "enormous conceit in my own ability to persuade people" was shattered by Jinnah, his "tricks didn't work with Jinnah" when they worked with every leader of the Congress (Chawla, 2009).

The blueprint of division of Punjab and Bengal, in case partition of India became inevitable had been sketched by Lord Wavell in 1945-1947 but he never thought seriously of implementing it. He wanted to use it as a bargaining chip with both Congress and Muslim League for their separate demand of either a united or divided India and it worked successfully and both agreed with the Cabinet Mission Plan to stay together in a loose federation/ confederation. But it was provided in the Cabinet Mission Plan that in case it failed Jinnah would have his Pakistan as per the Lahore Resolution. However, in proposing the boundaries of Punjab and Bengal, the two Hindu advisors of the two viceroys-Wavell and Mountbatten, including Menon, had devised partition plan that almost the same partition plan which was adopted and declared later by Radcliffe. Radcliffe, in his capacity as an impartial and independent Chairman of Boundary Commission, earlier on wanted to give Gurdaspur and other important cities such as Ferozepore, Zera etc, to Pakistan but changed his original plans. It was Mountbatten who not only murdered the spirit of the Cabinet Mission Plan but also forced Radcliffe to make last minute changes to accommodate Congress and India. Thus the final Radcliffe Award was nothing but a copy of Lord Wavell's Breakdown Plan, therefore, the entire exercise to divide Punjab freely, fairly and justly, proved futile (Chawla, 2009). But the Award resulted in unimaginable human tragedy and left a legacy of hatred and mistrust between India and Pakistan and has caused three wars. Mountbatten was overjoyed from the Congress to become Governor General of independent India but he was hurt when Jinnah declined his proposal of joint Governor General of India and Pakistan, yet it does not appear to be a decent act on the part of last viceroy of India Lord Mountbatten to influence the Radcliffe Award. He seems to be responsible for the 'dereliction of duty' and for his 'viceregal bias against Jinnah and Pakistan, and in favour of the more resourceful Commonwealth country- India of which he was to become the first Governor General of independent India?.

## References

- Abid, Q. M. A. (2011). Boundary Commission Tilting in favour of "Other Factors", *Pakistan Vision* Vol. 12 No. 2.
- Ali, Chaudri Muhammad.( 1983) *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab.
- Ali, R. U. (2009) Planning for the Partition of India 1947: A Scuttled Affair. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol.XXX, No.I,
- Bolitho, H. (1954). *Jinnah: The Creator of Pakistan*. London, John Murray.
- Brass, P. R. (2006). Victims, Heroes or Martyrs? Partition and the Problem of Memorialization in Contemporary Sikh history. *Sikh Formations*, 2(1).
- Burke, S. M., & Quraishi, S. A. D. (1995). *The British Raj in India: An Historical Review*. USA. Oxford University Press.
- Burke, S.M. & Salim Quraishi. (1995). *The British Raj in India: An Historical Review*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Chatterji, J. (1999).The Fashioning of a Frontier: the Radcliffe Line and Bengal's Border Landscape, 1947–52. *Modern Asian Studies*, 33(1),-185-242.
- Chawla, M. I. (2009). Wavell's Relations with His Majesty's Government. *Journal of South Asian Studies* 24(1)- 69-95.
- Chawla, M.I. (2009). Wavell's Breakdown Plan, 1945-47: an Appraisal. *JPS*, 16(2)- 220.
- Chawla, M.I. (2016). Mountbatten's Response to Communal Riots in the Punjab, *RAS*, August.
- Chester, L. (2000). Parting of the ways. *History Today*, 50(3)- 42.
- Chester, L. P. (2000). The Mapping of Empire: French and British cartographies of India in the late-eighteenth century. *Portuguese studies*, 16-256-275.
- Collins, L., & Lapierre, D. (1982). *Mountbatten and the Partition of India: March 22-August 15, 1947* (Vol. 1). Vikas.
- Collins, L., & Lapierre.D. (1997) *Freedom at Midnight*. London: Harper Collins Publications.
- Gabriel, M. C. (1996). *A Silence in the City and Other Stories*. Orient Blackswan.
- Garewal, S. M.( 2011) *Mountbatten's Viceroyalty and the Creation of Pakistan*. Lahore: Punjab University.
- Grover, V., & Arora, R. (Eds.). (1997). *Pakistan, Fifty Years of Independence: Independence and beyond: the fifty years, 1947-97* (Vol. 2). Deep & Deep.
- Hasan, M.( 2001) *India's Partition, Process, Strategy and Mobilization*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hilary, S. (2012). *Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability*. London: Routledge.
- Hodson, H.V. (1985). *The Great Divide*. London, Hutchinson Publications.
- Hugh, T. (1967). *Experiment with freedom: India and Pakistan, 1947* (Vol. 16). London: Oxford UP.

- Jalal, A. (1985). Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue. *Modern Asian Studies*, 19(1)-29-53.
- Jalal, A. (1985). *The Sole Spokesman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Johnson, A. C. (1951). *Mission with Mountbatten*. London, R. Hale.
- Khan, H. Z. (1995). *Mountbatten and Partition*, n.p: Montreal.
- Khhushik, R.K. (2015). "How Ferozepur Became Ours", *Times of India*.
- Kudaisya, G., & Yong, T. T. (2004). *The aftermath of partition in South Asia*. Routledge.
- Lamb, A. (1991). *Kashmir: a disputed legacy, 1846-1990*. Oxford University Press.
- Lodhi, M. Z. K. (1995). *Mountbatten's Anti-Pakistan Role*, Islamabad: National Book Foundation
- Lapierre, D., & Collins, L. (2017). *Freedom at midnight*. Mehta Publishing House.
- Latif, A.S. (1989). *The Partition of India and Mountbatten* New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distri.
- Lodhi, M. Z. K. (1993). *Mountbatten: Facts about the Partition, Revealed from the Original Documents*. MZK.
- Mahajan, M. C. (1963). *Looking Back: The Autobiography of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Former Chief Justice of India*. Asia Publishing House.
- Mahajan, M. C. (1963). *Looking Back*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.
- Masani, Z. (2018) 'Partition of India', *History Today*, volume 68, issue 4,
- Mansergh et al. (19983) *The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, Vol. XII, No. 162. London: His Majesty's Office
- Moon, P. (1961). *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Morris-Jones, W.H. (1983). Thirty -six years later: the mixed legacies of Mountbatten's transfer of power. Middle East in *International Affairs*, 59(4).
- Raza, S.H. (1982). *Mountbatten and Pakistan*. Karachi: Quaid-e-Azam academy, Pakistan.
- Roberts, A. (1995). *Eminent Churchillians*. London: Orion Publishers.
- Sadullah, M. M. (1983). *The Partition of the Punjab, 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents* (Vol. 2). National Documentation Centre.
- Samad, Y. (1999). Reflections on Partition: Pakistan Perspective. in *Region and Partition: Bengal Punjab and the Partition of the subcontinent*, eds., Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh. Karachi: Oxford University Press,
- Sherwani, L. A. (1986). *The Partition of India and Mountbatten*. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies.
- Singh, J. (2010). *Jinnah: India-Partition Independence*, New Delhi: Rupa Publications.
- The Pakistan Times*, 10 July 1948
- The Statesman*, 15 July 1947.
- Tinker, H. (1977). Pressure, Persuasion, and Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab, August 1947. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 36.
- Von, T. A. (2007). *Indian summer: The secret history of the end of an empire*. Macmillan.
- Williams, L. F. (1966). Rushbrook, *The State of Pakistan*. London, Faber.
- Wolpert, Stanley. (1997). *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University. Press.,
- Ziegler, P. (1985). *Mountbatten: The Official Biography*. London: Collins.

Received: Jan 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018

Revisions Received: Jun 5<sup>th</sup>, 2018